【作者简介】
郁光华，香港大学法学院任职。
【注释】 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, Jr., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). George Stigler and Claire Friedland, “The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means” 26 J.L. & Econ. 237 (1983); Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences” 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (1985).
Mark Roe, “A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance,” 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991); Mark Roe, “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States” 102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993).
Michael Jensen and William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
Frank Modigliani and Merton Millars, “The Costs of Capital, Corporate Finance, and the Theory of Investment,” Am. Econ. Rev. 48 (June 1958).
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131, 1137 (1997).
Jeffrey Gordon, “Corporate Governance: Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany,” 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 219, 223 (1999).
Roberta Karmel, “Italian Stock Market Reform,” N.Y.L.J., Aug 20, 1998, at 3.
Eugene Fama and Michael Jesen, “Agency Problems and Residual Claims,” 26 J.L. and Econ. 327 (1983).
Kenneth Arrow, “The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk Bearing,” 31 Rev. Econ. Stud. 97 (1964).
Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 4 Economica 386 (1937).
见注释8。
Harold Demstz and Kenneth Lehn, “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences,” 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155, 1158 (1985).
见注释6，第220页。
Stefan Prigge, “A Survey of German Corporate Governance” in Klans Hope et al., Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of the Art and Emerging Research 943, 998-90(1998).
D. Neuberger and M Neumann, “Banking and Antitrust: Limiting Industrial Ownership by Banks? J. Institutional and Theoretical Econ. 147, 188-99(1991).
Theodor Baums, “Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks,” 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 503, 508(1992).
Michael Porter, “Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System,” Harv. Bus. Rev. 65 (Sept.-Oct., 1992).
Joseph Grundfest, “Subordination of American Capital,” 27 J. Fin. Econ. 89(1990).
Mark Roe, “A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance,”91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991); Mark Roe, “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,” 102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993); John Pound, “The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,” 68 N.Y.L. Rev. 103 (1993).
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, “Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73, 77-81 (1995).
George Stigler and Claire Friedland, “The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means,” 36 J. L. & Econ. 237 (1983).
Harold Demsetz, “The Structure of the Ownership and the Theory of the Firm,” 26 J. L. & Econ. 375 1983).
Roberta Romano, “Public Pension Fund Activities in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,” 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (1993).
John Coffee, Jr., “Liquidity Verses Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,” 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1977 (1991).
Jonathan Macey, “Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: Toward A More Scientific Approach,” 10 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 16, 24 (1998).
Ronald Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, “Reinvesting the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors,” 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 880 (1991).
Robert Vanecko, “Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance,” 87 Nw. U.L. Rev. 376, 406-08 (1992).
Thomas Smith, “Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance,” 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 18-27 (1997).
Roberta Romano, “Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance,” 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174 (2001).
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997); Asli Demirguc – Kunt & Vosislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance and Firms, 53 J. Fin 2107, 2134 (1988).
Andrei Schleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737 (1997).
John Coffee, Jr., “The Future as History: the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications,” 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 641, 644 (1999).
见注释22, 第390页。
Luigi Zingales, “The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience,” 7 Rev. Fin. Stud. 125 (1994).
Steven Kaplan, “Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany,” 10 J. L. Econ. and Org. 142-59 (1994); Steven Kaplan, “Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States,” 102 J. Pol. Econ. 510-546 (1994).
见注释6, 第236页。
Douglas Smith, “The Venture Capital Company: A Contractual Rebuttal to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?” 65 Term. L. Rev. 79 (1979).
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” 53 J. Fin. 737, 766 (1997).
Masahiko Aoki, “Towards an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,” 28 J. Econ. Literature 1 (1990); Jonathan Charkham, Keeeping Good Company: a Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries (1994); Michael Porter, “Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System,” Harv. Bus. Rev. 65(1992).
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, “Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (1996); Curtis Milhaupt, “The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate,” 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 865 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al, “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997); Asli Demirguc – Kunt & Vosislav Maksimovie, “Law, Finance and Firm Growth,” 53 J. Fin. 2107, 2134 (1998).
Roberta Romano, “A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law,” 102 Yale L.J. 2021, 2025 (1993).
见注释29，第176页。
Merritt Fox & Michael Heller, “Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascoes,” 75 N. Y.U.L. Rev. 1770, 1722 (2000).
见注释１，斯蒂格勒和费拉特莱特，第２５９页。
见注释３４，第１２５－１４８页。
Ronald Lease et. Al., “The Market Value of Capital in Publicly-Traded Corporations,” 11 J. Fin. Econ. 439 (1993).
见注释３８。
Bernard Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets,” 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781, 783 (2001).
关于成都红光实业股份有限公司违反证券法规行为的处罚决定，中国证券监督管理委员会公告，1998年12月8日。
姚备，“PT红光 — 第一例上市公司被刑事处罚”，人民网，2000年12月15日。
骆晓鸣，“中国证监会查处‘活力二八’，人民网，2000年12月20日。
证券监督管理委员会关于对三九医药股份有限公司及有关人员予以公开批评的通报，证券监督管理委员会，2001年8月27日。
中国证监会，
上市公司章程指引，1997年12月16日。
证券监督管理委员会关于对湖北美尔雅股份有限公司及有关人员予以公开批评的通报，证券监督管理委员会，2001年9月20日。
证券监督管理委员会关于上海嘉宝﹙集团﹚实业股份有限公司违反证券法规行为的处罚决定，中国证券监督管理委员会公告，2000年10月8日。
Philip Gregony, “Securities Fraud in the PRC,” China Law and Practice 20, 21 (March 1995).
证券时报，2000年2月29日。
见注释25，第19页。
见注释34，第125-148页。
Douglas Smith, “The Venture Capital Company: A Contractual Rebuttal to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?” 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 79 (1997); Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson, “Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Verses Stock Markets,” 47 J. Fin. Econ. 243 (1998).
见注释38，第771和774页。
见注释16，第515页。
Henry Manne, “Managers and the Market for Corporate Control,” 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965).
Roberta Romano, “The Future of Hostile Takeover: Legislation and Public Opinion,” 57 U. Cin L. Rev. 457 (1988).
Michael Jensen, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control System,” 48 J. Fin. 831, 835-47 (1993).
Stuart Rosenstein and Jeffrey Wyatt, “Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth,” 26 J. Fin. Econ. 175 (1990).
Ronald Daniels and Paul Halpern, “Too Close for Comfort: The Role of the Closely Held Public Corporation in the Canadian Economy and Implications for Public Policy,” 4 Can. Bus. L.J. 11 (1995-96).
